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STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1992) provides:

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(h) (1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The accepted provisions of both parties' documents comprised the

parties' contract, as agreed by them, and the defendant's pre-printed standard form did
not supersede the plaintiffs contract, which was signed and agreed to by defendant at
virtually the same time.
Standard of Review: The interpretation and application of the two contracts is
a question of law and this court will not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion,
even though that conclusion denominated as a "factual" determination. Buehner Block
Co. v. UWC Assoc.. 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988); 50 West Broadway Associate? vt
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989); Scharffv. BMG Corp.. 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The parties' intent and the determinative facts will not
be disturbed if based upon substantial competent evidence. Kimball v. Campbell. 699
P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)
2.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that Mr. Pack breached the

contract when defendant:

l

t.

Failed to complete the work of manufacturing and installing

cabinets in plaintiffs home in a competent, workmanlike manner; and,
b.

Failed to provide specific drawings and plans as required under

c.

Failed to repair and correct the defective installation of cabinets in

the contract.

plaintiffs home;
Standard of Review: The legal determination and result of the facts is a legal
issue for which the court will not defer to the trial court's determination. Scharff. 700
P.2d at 1070. The court will disturb tne trial court's findings of fact if the findings
are determined to be clearly erroneous and are not based upon substantial competent
evidence. In Rc Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Kimball, 699 P.2d
at 716
3.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant's employee to testify

as a defense witness after she violated the witness exclusion rule.
Standard of Review: Whether the witness' testimony in violation of the
exclusion rule U admissible is a question of law and is reviewed under a "correctness
standard". StlftY Fff™™* 817 P.2d 774, 781, n. 3 (Utah 1991) The court will
not disturb any decision within the discretion of the trial court unless there is a clear
showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v. Carlson. 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981)

2

4.

Whether the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendant is supported

by substantial, competent evidence and by adequate findings of fact.
Standard of Review: An award of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of
a clear abuse of discretion. However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by
evidence in the record. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988);
Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff/Appellant E.L. Pack & Associates appeals from the final judgment and
findings of the Third Circuit Court after a trial on May 8, 1990, in an action for
defendant's breach of contract to construct and install cabinets in plaintiffs new home.

Course of thg Proceedings and Disposition Below
Mr. Pack filed a complaint against the defendant on September 5, 1989, for
defendant's breach of contract for failure to construct cabinets in accordance with the
provision of contract documents, failure to correct defective workmanship and defects,
failure to timely perform the construction work, and a failure to guarantee the material
and labor all as required by the terms of the parties' contract.
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Defendant Cabinet Shoppe file an answer and counterclaim, alleging that it had
performed and satisfied the contract and that Mr. Pack had not paid a $5,000.00
balance on the contract.
After a one-day trial before the Honorable Maurice Jones in Summit County on
May 8, 1990, Judge Jones took the matter under advisement. On July 6, 1990, Judge
Jones orally ruled that the defendant's standard form contract completely superseded
the contract prepared by Mr. Pack, and signed by defendant, and rendered its
provisions void. The judge ruled that Mr. Pack had prevented the Cabinet Shoppe
from completing the contract and awarded defendant $5,025.00 on the contract and
attorney fees of $2,947.00. The court impliedly rejected Mr. Pack's substantial
evidence of defendant's non-conforming, incompetent work, untimely performance and
failure to correct defects.
Defendant filed bankruptcy on July 6, 1990, in California. The resulting
automatic stay delayed this matter almost two (2) years. After obtaining authorization
from the bankruptcy court defendant filed Findings of Fact and a Judgment which
were entered on June 29, 1992.
Mr. Packfiledhis Notice of Appeal on July 21, 1992.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Pack constructed his new home in The Jeremy Ranch subdivision in 1988.
(Tr. 136) This home is a custom home, built with the highest quality materials and
labor. (Tr. 13)
Luanda Jean Lewis, a sales representative for the defendant Cabinet Shoppe,
approached Mr. Pack at the construction site in April, 1988. She asked if she could
bid on his cabinetry needs for the home. (Tr. 136) Mr. Pack accepted her request to
bid, and gave Mrs. Lewis his house plan. The Cabinet Shoppe returned a bid of
$17,700.00, with a drawing of proposed cabinets. (Tr. 136)
Mr. Pack did not accept that bid. He informed the Cabinet Shoppe that he had
a much different design and configuration in mind and requested a new bid
corresponding to his concept and design. (Tr. 137)
The Cabinet Shoppe placed a second bid corresponding to Mr. Pack's request.
The bid totaled $13,000. (Tr. 137) The parties further negotiated the job
requirements, the specifications, installation, and price until a final agreement was
reached. (Tr. 139)
On June 10, 1988, Mr. Pack wrote to Ms. Lewis at the Cabinet Shoppe,
confirming various job specifications, including solid oak wood on all faces, frames,
doors, drawers, fillers, trim and molding, and the outside of all the cabinets,
completely precluding any plastic visible on the outside of any of the cabinets. (PI.
5

Exh. 6, Tr. 10, 18-9) Also, the Cabinet Shoppe was to provide specific drawings
indicating the materials to be used in construction. (PI. Exh. 6, Tr. 10, 18, 19) Mr.
Pack further insisted that the outside finish of the cabinets be "absolutely stunning".
(PL Exh. 6, Tr. 18-9)
Soon after his letter, Mr. Pack prepared a four-page agreement with the
Cabinet Shoppe, including his job requirements which he signed and mailed to the
Cabinet Shoppe on June 18, 1988. (PL Exh. 1)
At about the same time, the Cabinet Shoppe mailed to Mr. Pack its "Standard
Form of Agreement for Cabinets and Installation". Mrs. Lewis signed this agreement
for the Cabinet Shoppe on June 22, 1988, and mailed it to Mr. Pack with two
drawings prepared by her. (Tr. 144-5, PL Exh. 3) These drawings reflected a rough,
basic layout of the sub-assemblies of the cabinets from a floor view only. (Tr. 17)
Mrs. Lewis also enclosed two invoices, both dated August 6, 1988. Each invoice was
designated "Cabinets, partial cost". One showed a price of $3,500, the other, a price
of $5,000. (Def. Exh. 4, Tr. 145-6)
Ms. Lewis also presented Mr. Pack with a handwritten "confirmation list".
(PL Exh. 2) This document requested Mr. Pack to confirm the size and height of the
ceiling, range hood, range top, oven and pan. (PL Exh. 2, Tr. 14)
At the same time on June 22, 1988, that she signed her standard contract form,
Mrs. Lewis also signed Mr. Pack's contract for the Cabinet Shoppe. She wrote
6

several comments on Pack's contract itself, such as "oak top veneer with oak nosing
will have one seam" and "drawer front are screwed to pro-system". (PI. Exh. 1)
When Mr. Pack received the Cabinet Shoppe standard contract form, he
specifically rejected the "exclusive contract clause", para. no. 8, a limitation of work
provision, para. no. 5, and the warranty provision at the bottom of the form. Mr.
Pack wrote "takes exception" in the margin next to each of these the rejected
provisions. (PI. Exh. 3, Tr. 15) Mr. Pack then signed the Cabinet Shoppe form on
June 28, 1988 and returned it to the Cabinet Shoppe with a letter to Mrs. Lewis dated
the same day. (PI. Exh. 7, Tr. 146-7)
In Mr. Pack's June 28, 1988 letter (PI. Exh. 7) sent to defendant with
defendant's contract, Mr. Pack again rejected of items 5 and 8 and the warranty
language and explained that:
As to paragraph 5 of the Cabinet Shoppe's agreement, we respectfully
take exception to #5. Installation of cabinets is included in price. The
Cabinet Shoppe also to install customer furnished Rangair hood and
make transition from fan assembly to five inch flu. . . . We respectfully
take exception to #8. Our agreement of June 18, 1988, is not
superseded by Cabinet Shoppe's agreement.
Mr. Packreiteratedhis exception to the warranty language, specifying that the Cabinet
Shoppe was to be liable for labor, mileage, travel, time and necessary materials to
correct any warranty problems during the warranty period. (PI. Exh. 7)
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Also in his June 28 letter (PI. Exh. 7), Mr. Pack specifies additional
construction details of the cabinets, drawers and dimensions not included in the
defendant's agreement. (PI. Exh. 7, Tr. 162) This letter and the signed standard
form Cabinet Shoppe agreement were returned by Mr. Pack to Mrs. Lewis at the
Cabinet Shoppe. (Tr. 144, 146-7) The Cabinet Shoppe accepted Mr. Pack's
specifications, and did not respond to the June 28 letter. (Tr. 16, 147)
Both parties testified and agreed at trial that both contract documents were
intended to be their agreement, and that agreement was also supplemented by the
drawings and other correspondence between the parties. (Tr. 16, 166)
On July 14, 1988, Mr. Pack sent another letter to Mrs. Lewis at the Cabinet
Shoppe, (PI. Exh. 8), asking her to furnish the detailed frontal view drawings required
by the contract. The two pages of basic layout drawings were considered insufficient
and inaccurate because they failed to show details,frontal views and elevations. (Tr.
17, 20-1, 57; PL Exh. 8, 17) Further drawings anticipated by the contract were never
provided. (Tr. 17)
Throughout this time, Mr. Pack and various Cabinet Shoppe employees
regularly communicated with each other through letters and phone calls. (Tr. 21-2)
The expected delivery date for the cabinets was approximately July 18, 1988
(PL Exh. 1), but the Cabinet Shoppe did not begin to deliver pieces and parts of the
sub-assemblies until the third week of August, 1988. (Tr. 22) As of trial the
8

installation of the cabinets, also with a deadline of July 18, 1988, (PL Exh. 1) was
never completed. (Tr. 22). The parties were in regular communication during this
time regarding delivery and installation. (Tr. 22, PI. Exhs. 6-12)
On October 4, 1988, Ms. Lewis mailed to Mr. Pack a Cabinet Shoppe invoice
for $5,025 as the "balance on the cabinetry*. (Def. Exh. 5, Tr. 147)
On October 19, 1988, Mr. Pack returned that invoice to Mrs. Lewis with his
letter objecting because work on the cabinets remained incomplete. (PI. Exh. 9, Tr.
23, 147) Mr. Pack included an extensive list of the uncompleted work, including:
trim between cabinet above refrigerator and west wall; enlarge access to toe kick
heaters; fill nail holes; finish out underside of cabinet above kitchen desk; dividers in
cabinet above refrigerator need to be removable - also, the bottom slots and cheap
plastic are visible; oak grid in kitchen light box has separated from main frame;
delaminating roller trays; install tray on west lazy susan at correct height; missing
shelves in kitchen and bath cabinets; close gap on upper stage cabinets above kitchen
desk; appliance center has rough saw edge at counter top; laundry room drawer will
not clear door casing; kick plate on laundry room cabinet does not go to floor;
drawers in muter bath vanity do not operate smoothly; and, bottom drawer of kitchen
desk was to be a file drawer. (PI. Exh. 9) Mr. Pack also complained of plastic
facings on the cabinets and defendant's missed deadlines as to the delivery and
installation. (PL Exh. 9, Tr. 26) Mr. Pack complimented Cabinet Shoppe worker
9

Mark Sellers on his "good job on the installation", but expressed frustration that Mr.
Sellers' lack of communication regarding times he said he would be working on the
job. Mr. Sellers would fail to keep scheduled appointments to work on the cabinets
and gave no notice regarding his failures to show up. (PI. Exh. 9)
Responding to Plaintiffs complaints, Mrs. Lewis attempted to excuse the
Cabinet Shoppe's faulty performance and blamed Mr. Pack for excessive removing,
rebuilding, and reinstallations. (Def. Exh. 6, Tr. 148) Mrs. Lewis failed to
recognize that the removing, rebuilding, and reinstallations had been necessary
because of the Cabinet Shoppe's failure to conform to the contract specifications.
Mrs. Lewis agreed to repair a few of the enumerated deficiencies only if Mr. Pack
would contact Mr. Sellers directly to finish the work, and provided that Mr. Pack
delivered a cashier's check for $5,025 to Mr. Sellers at the time the repair work was
done. (Def. Exh. 6)
Mrs. Lewis threatened to file a mechanics lien on the home if Mr. Pack did not
pay before November 8, 1988. (Tr. 149, Def. Exh. 7)
Near the end of October, Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers mutually agreed for
completion of the work in the Pack home. (Tr. 176, 158, 26, 27)
Mr. Pack prepared a letter dated November 1, 1988, to Mr. Sellers and
enclosed his October 19, 1988, letter detailing the continuing defects with the
cabinets. (PI. Exh. 10) The November 1 also letter set forth additional repairs
10

needed to provide access to the toe kick heaters, and requested removal of the red
stain on the kitchen counter and replacement of the non-conforming CDX plywood
trim on the entertainment center. (PI. Exh. 10) This letter was hand delivered to Mr.
Sellers' office on November 2, 1988.
On November 2, 1988, Mr. Gary Lewis and Mr. Sellers went to Mr. Pack's
home. (Tr. 28-9) Mr. Lewis was also a principal in the Cabinet Shoppe. (Tr. 1334) He had never been to Mr. Pack's home before. Neither Lewis nor Sellers had
arranged with Pack to meet them or informed him they were coming. (Tr. 66)
When Lewis and Sellers arrived and found that Mr. Pack was not at the home,
Mr. Lewis threatened physical violence to Mr. Pack's 72-year-old father (who was at
the home), in an attempt to coerce payment. After Lewis' threats, the two Cabinet
Shoppe principals then left the home without attempting any repairs or corrections.
(Tr. 27, 176)
When Mr. Pack returned home later and discovered what had occurred, Mr.
Pack advised Mr. Lewis by letter that he, Lewis, was not permitted in Mr. Pack's
home because of his threats on November 2, 1988. (PI. Exh. 11, Tr. 28)
Also on November 7th, Mr. Pack spoke with Mr. Sellers on the telephone
regarding the November 2, 1988, incident and Cabinet Shoppe's failure to make the
repairs and corrections. (PL Exh. 12, Tr. 29) Mr. Pack again wrote to Mr. Sellers
on November 11, 1988, to follow up the telephone conversation and detailed the
11

problemsremainingon the job. (PI. Exh. 12) Mr. Pack's November 2 letter also
detailed Cabinet Shoppe's failure to conform to original specifications, and detailed
cabinet damage and other installation problems. (PI. Exhs. 12, 17) Finally, Mr. Pack
advised Cabinet Shoppe that if it did not complete the cabinets by November 17,
1988, Mr. Pack would complete the work himself and have the cost of completion
deducted from the balance owed to the Cabinet Shoppe. (PI. Exh. 12)
Despite these deadlines communications continued between the panties. On
November 28, 1988, Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers, discussed lowering the microwave
and the oven cabinet installations. Mr. Sellers agreed to find an answer to those
problems and respond to Mr. Pack, yet failed to do so. (PI. Exh. 13)
On December 16, 1988, Mr. Pack detailed for Mr. Sellers, Pack's attempts to
contact the Cabinet Shoppe over the past several weeks. Mr. Pack again gave
defendant a partial list of corrections needed, referring to the cabinet above the
refrigerator, roll-out trays, the entertainment center, and gaps between the cabinet
doors. (Pi. Exh. 13) These items were never repaired or corrected. (Tr. 71)
On that same day, the Cabinet Shoppe filed a notice of mechanics lien against
Mr. Pack's home.
At the time of trial the cabinets as installed still failed to meet contract
specifications and/or were improperly installed as demonstrated by the photographic
exhibits and Mr. Pack's unrefuted testimony:
12

Obvioui gaps exist between the kitchen cabinet doors. (PI. Exh. 26)
The oven and microwave combination were mounted too high for
convenient use. (PI. Exh. 27)
The microwave trim kit cannot be installed as specified. (PI. Exhs. 278)
Splits exist in the framework of more than half of the cabinets in the
home. (PI. Exhs. 29-30)
The kitchen desk does not include a file drawer as specified in drawings.
(PI. Exhs. 4, 31)
The plastic tape used by defendant, contrary to contract specifications, is
plainly visible and greatly contrasts the oak stain used on the cabinets.
(PL Exhs. 32-4, 36, 38-42, 45-7, 52, 66)
The shelf above the refrigerator visibly sags in the center and is missing
trim. (PL Exh. 34)
The range hood assembly fails to contain a raised panel in conformance
with contract specifications. (PL Exh. 34)
Obvious nail holes are filled with a considerably lighter shade of putty
than the oak stain. (PL Exh. 35)
The access to the toe kick heaters under the kitchen and master bath
sinks is not large enough for removal and/or maintenance. (PL Exhs.
37,67)
The appliance center fails to open completely, includes obvious raw saw
cuts, tad has not been properly squared off on the bottom left corner.
(PL Exh. 38-9)
The plastic tape bordering the appliance center was improperly laid
which create obvious wrinkles in the tape and delamination. (PL Exh.
40,42)
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obvious gross misalignment of the majority of cabinet drawers and doors
throughout the home. (PI. Exh. 45-6, 48, 66)
Gouges, scratches, and chips in the oak and plastic tape. (Pi. Exh. 49,
54, 61-2)
Furniture buttons which plug access to screw holes are inconsistently
featured and are inconsistent with industry standards. (PI. Exh. 51)
Cabinet doors are visibly too short and much too narrow to cover plastic
tape cabinet contents, and they are not in alignment with the end piece of
the cabinet. (PI. Exh. 52)
The linoleum and carpet had to be coved despite specific provisions in
the parties' contract for oak kick plates. (PI. Exhs. 53, 59)
The entertainment center features drawers in the lower stage cabinets
despite specific communications to the contrary. (PI. Exhs. 8, 55, 58-9)
The crown mold above the entertainment center has an obvious wide
unjoined joint, visible throughout the room. (PI. Exh. 57)
The CDX plywood on the east side of the wet bar assembly is stained
and does not match the finished wood cabinet exterior. (PL Exh. 58)
The upper stage cabinets in the entertainment center have not been
completed with trim and molding. (PI. Exh. 60)
The cabinet assembly above the student desk in bedroom number 2 is
mounted several feet too high resulting in its being useless, and
compromises half of the light fixture socket. (PI. Exh. 69)
Mr. Pack alio described other defendants shown in the photographs admitted at trial
and unrefuted by defendant.
On September 5, 1989, Mr. Pack filed his complaint against the Cabinet
Shoppe alleging defendant's failure to construct the cabinets in accordance with the
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contract specifications, failure to correct defective workmanship and defects, failure to
timely perform the construction work causing additional expense to him, and failure to
guarantee defendant's material and labor as required by the contract.

SUMMARY 0¥ ARGUMENT
The parties9 contract included the terms prepared by Mr. Pack as well as the
provisions which he agreed to in the defendant's standard form. The defendant's
standard form did not wholly replace the plaintiffs prior document. Two separate
documents (with the exception of certain provisions) constituted one contract for the
construction and installation of cabinets in Mr. Pack's home. Both parties considered
the two documents together to be the four corners of their agreement. However, the
trial court ignored the parties' agreed testimony on this issue and threw Mr. Pack's
contract out in favor of defendant's standard form contract. Mr. Pack had clearly
rejected certain provisions of the standard form, writing "takes exception" next to
those paragraphs in defendant's proposed agreement inconsistent with Mr. Pack's
agreement aad agreed to specifications. Mr. Pack's rejections were never questioned
by defendant. The court's finding that the second contract applies in its entirety is, in
fact, a legal conclusion that is clearly in error and is not based on any evidence.
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In addition, the trial court's finding that Mr. Pack failed to allow defendant to
make repairs or corrections to the cabinets in the home is clearly erroneous and a
complete marshaling of the evidence finds no support for this finding.
The Cabinet Shoppe was awarded the full contract price by the trial court
despite the overwhelming evidence that (1) defendant failed to provide the necessary
drawings before installation and construction; (2) the job was only partially completed,
and, (3) the completed work not comply with the contract terms, and was not
completed in a workmanlike manner.
The trial court also erred when it failed to exclude Mrs. Lewis as. a witness at
trial and then allowed her to testify after hearing all of plaintiffs evidence. The
violation of the exclusion rule enabled Mrs. Lewis to tailor her testimony to support
defendant's other evidence and to contradict the testimony of Mr. Pack's witnesses.
The trial court clearly abused its discretion by permitting defendant to violate the
witness exclusion rule.
Finally, the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees to
defendant. Although Utah law allows attorney's fees as per contractual agreement,
the award must be supported by evidence in the record. In marshaling the evidence
presented at trial, it is clear that defendant did not present evidence to support the
basis for the trial court's award under the provisions of the parties' contract.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE SECOND
CONTRACT DOCUMENT SUPERSEDES THE FIRST
CONTRACT DOCUMENT, AND THAT THE TERMS OF THE
SECOND CONTRACT DOCUMENT CONTROL IS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
Two separate written contract documents were executed between the parties at
about the same time. The first contract document was prepared and presented by Mr.
Pack to defendant. The second contract document was defendant's pre-printed,
standard form which defendant required Mr. Pack to sign. (Findings of Fact, para.
1). The court correctly found that the parties considered both contract documents
binding. (Findings of Fact, para. 2) (Tr. 16, 166) The court erred in ruling that the
second document superseded the first. If parties intend to create one contract, the
number of documents that comprise and memorialize the agreement is irrelevant.
Sacramento Baseball v. Great N. Baseball. 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987)
Paragraph 8 of the parties second contract document reads "This agreement sets
forth the entile transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreements, made by
either party ire superseded by this agreement". Mr. Pack clearlyrejectedthis
provision by writing the phrase "takes exception" beside this paragraph, as well as
paragraph 5 and the portion at the bottom of the contract document concerning
warrant. In addition Mr. Pack sent the contract to defendant with a letter that
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specifically stated shy he was rejecting those terms. Defendant accepted his changes
and his letter and never responded to discuss those provisions further. (PI. Exh. 3,
Tr. 15)
However, despite defendant's acceptance of both contracts, the trial court found
that the second contract document, superseded the first contract document. Despite
Mr. Pack's written exceptions to paragraphs 5, 8 and the warranties of the second
contract, the court concluded that any conflicting provisions between the contract
documents would be controlled by the terms of the second contract document.
(Findings of Fact, para. 3 and 4) Despite the defendant's acknowledgement that both
contracts were binding and of Mr. Pack's unequivocal rejection of paragraph 8, the
court mistakenly reached the legal conclusion (mistakenly stated as a finding of fact)
that the language of the defendant's contract document completely eliminates all the
terms agreed to by the parties contained in Mr. Pack's contract document. "A trial
courtsfindingscannot be made up out of whole cloth; substantial, competent evidence
must exist that supports the findings, and when afindingof fact is not so supported, it
must berejected."50 West Broadway Associates. 784 P.2d at 1171
The trial court erroneously completely discounted Mr. Pack's rejection of the
paragraphs marked "takes exception". (Tr. 15) On cross examination when counsel
for defendant asked what Mr. Pack meant by writing "takes exception" on those
specific paragraphs of defendant's contract document, plaintiff stated:
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A:
We will not comply with it. It's a—it's a term that's commonly
used in my industry when reviewing specifications that we will not
provide per that item or comply with that item.
Tr. 75.
Furthermore, Mr. Pack's rejection of the "superseding" contract clause by the
statement "takes exception" directly on the contract document itself clearly
communicated that the defendant's contract did not supersede the first signed
agreement. (PI. Exh. 7) Plaintiffs Exhibit 7 is the letter dated June 28, 1988, from
Mr. Pack to defendant which accompanied the defendant's contract document signed
by Mr. Pack. Mr. Pack testified that this letter explained the phrase "takes exception
by stating:
We respectfully take exception to No. 8. Our agreement of June 18th,
1988, is not superseded by Cabinet Shoppe's agreement.
(Tr. 15-6)
Mr. Pack further stated that he never received any response to his letter regarding the
inserted phrases, and that it was his understanding as well as the Cabinet Shoppe's that
the complete agreement included both contract documents. (Tr. 15-6) Mr. Pack's
contractual agreements and disagreement were written specifically on the document
and were documented and explained in accompanying correspondence. The Cabinet
Shoppe relied merely upon a pre-printed form. When a handwritten provision
conflicts with typewritten or printed provision of a contract, the handwritten provision
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controls. Wood River Pipeline v. Willbros Energy. 241 Kan. 580, 738 P.2d 866
(1987); Emmert v. O'Brien. 72 Or. App. 752, 697 P.2d 222 (1985) Yet the trial
court ignored Mr. Pack's rejection of defendant's pre-printed, boiler-plate clauses.
During her testimony, Luanda Jean Lewis, defendant's employee, admitted that
she received Mr. Pack's letter with the agreement. (Tr. 162) She also testified that
the Cabinet Shoppe considered both documents binding as part of the parties'
agreement. (Tr. 166)
The law protects the reasonable expectations of both party to the contract.
Nixon and Nixon. Inc. v. John New & Associates, 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982);
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) In order to interpret such
reasonableness of the expectations? it is necessary to examine and understand the
communications between the parties discussing these provisions. (See PI. Exh. 7)
All writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together.
Restatement of Contracts, § 235 (1932) If both parties' contracts were intended by
both parties to comprise the terms of a single agreement between them (Tr- 16, 166)
then the agreement should be enforce according to those terms. And, those terms
included thote not objected to. Pack's handwritten notation "takes exception" can
only mean to any reasonable layman that paragraph 8 of the second document was not
intended to be and was not an agreed term of the contract and that "unaccepted" to
terms in both documents were agreed to.
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The Restatement of Contracts. § 236 further requires the trial court to accept
both contract documents prepared by the parties, and signed off by both parties as the
complete integrated agreement, including the written phrase inserted by Mr. Pack.
(c) Where there is an inconsistency between general and specific
provisions, the specific provisions ordinarily qualify the meaning of the
general provisions.
* * *

(e) Where written provisions are inconsistent with printed provisions, an
interpretation is preferred which gives effect to the written provisions.
Restatement of Contracts § 236 (1932)
The trial court's ruling is also in conflict with the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. When Mr. Pack returned defendant's contract document he clearly advised
defendant that the "exclusivity provisions" and the warranty language were not
accepted and were not part of the agreement. (PI. Exh. 7) The defendant never
objected to or disputed Mr. Pack's rejection of those terms. Both parties understood
that the agreement included both contract documents and the accepted provisions
therein. (Tr. 15-6)
Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 clearly affirmed to Mr.
Pack that paragraphs 5 and 8 and the warranty language of defendant's boiler-plate
contract were not part of the agreement. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 201
provides that:
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* * *

(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the
meaning attached by one of them if at the time it was made
* * *

(b) that party had no reason to know of any different
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to
know the meaning attached by the first party.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 201 (1979)
Moreover, the general prevailing meaning of the language "takes exception" is
a rejection of that provision to which the language is addressed. See, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. § 202(3) (where language has a generally prevailing meaning,
it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning).
Mr. Pack defined his own "takes exception" notation to mean that, " . . .
we will not comply with it". (Tr. 75) Several legal definitions and the general
meaning of "except" or "exception" support Mr. Pack's interpretation of "takes
exception". Black's Law Dictionary, quoting In re; Kelly's Estate, 153 Misc. 445,
274 N.Y.S. 488 (1934) defines "exception" as:
. . . a person, thing, or case specified as distinct or not included; an act
of excepting, omitting from mention or leaving out of consideration; and
"except" means not including.
Black's Law Dictionary. 667 (4th Ed. 1951). "Exception" has also been defined as "a
restriction by taking out something which would otherwise be included, as in a class,
statement, or rule." Markle v. Markle. 20 Hawaii 633 (1911), and as to specific
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terms used with reference to contracts "is the taking some part of the subject-matter of

the contract out of it." Wilmington & R.R, Co, y, Robeson, 5 Ired. 391, 27 N.c.
391, 393 (1845) cL Jones v, Acme Building Products. Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 206,
450 P.2d 743 (1969), (trial court properly admitted extrinsic evidence to show the true
intentions of the parties, because "fair and equitable result will be preferred over a
harsh or unreasonable one"). In addition, the court held:
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has any right to
ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because
it may subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be enforced
"in accordance with the intention as . . . manifested by the language
used by the parties to the contract."
Id. While the trial court in the case at hand properly admitted extrinsic evidence to
show the true intent of the parties, the court's legal conclusion directly contradicts the
clear and undisputed evidence of that intent.
Where documents are executed "substantially contemporaneously and are
clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and harmonized, if possible."
Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., Utah Ct. App., No. 910370-CA, Slip Op. (Feb.
4, 1993); AUli Corp, V. ClQVJS Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987)
The court's legal conclusion that only the defendant's pre-printed standard form
contract document constituted the entire agreement is inequitable and clearly contrary
to both parties9 evidence.
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POINT n
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
DEFENDANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
It is the responsibility of the trial court to makefindingson all material issues.
If the trial court fails to makefindingsto each issue, then thosefindingsare reversible
error unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and capable of
supporting only afindingof fact in favor of the judgment. Acton v. Deliran. 737
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987); Potter v. Potter. 205 U.A.R. 37 (Ct. App. 1992)
The trial court found that plaintiff "materially breached the contract by failing
to pay for the cabinets" (Finding of Fact 7). However, despite plaintiffs
overwhelming and unrefuted evidence presented of uncompleted, substandard
cabinetry work, unsightly workmanship and the failure to provide specific drawings as
required in the parties9 contract, the trial court made nofindingsof fact thereon.
In addition the court'sfindingthat Mr. Pack refused to allow repairs to be
conducted to the cabinets is totally against the weight of the evidence. The court's
findings as to plaintiffs breach will bereversedonly if thefindingsare determined to
be erroneous or otherwise mistaken. In Re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989).
The court'sfindingsand judgment of a "breach- by Mr. Pack and the refusal to
find defendant's breach are not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
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A,

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO MAKE REPAIRS OR CORRECTIONS
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by defendant and

signed by the trial court, Findings of Fact, paragraph 7 reads in part:
7.
The court finds that Pack materially breached the second
contract . . . by failing to allow the Cabinet Shoppe to make the
corrections requested, and that the Cabinet Shoppe had no reasonable
opportunity under the circumstances to make the corrections requested.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 4. However, the evidence presented at
trial clearly demonstrates this finding is clearly erroneous and against the weight of
the testimony.
The cabinets were to be delivered and installed on approximately July 18, 1988.
(PI. Exh. 1) Defendant's contract document states "delivery date, when given, shall
be deemed approximate . . . . " (PL Exh. 3, para. 2) However, defendant did not
begin to deliver cabinets to Mr. Pack's home until some time in mid-August (Tr. 169)
and did not install the cabinets until a much later date. Between the date of delivery
in August and November 7, defendant worked on the installation of the cabinets many
times with no claim by defendant of any kind of interference from Mr. Pack.
Defendant first complains it was interfered with on November 2, 1988. (Tr. 176)
There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Pack ever prevented defendant from
correcting or finishing its work.
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On October 19, 1988, Mr. Pack sent a letter to defendant detailing several
problems to be corrected and completed. (PI. Exh. 9) The letter detailed many areas
in Mr. Pack's home that remained uncompleted, including adding trim between the
cabinet above the refrigerator and west wall, filling nail holes in crown mold and
dental mold, finishing out the underside of the cabinet above the kitchen desk (PI.
Exh. 48), enlarging the access to the toe kick heaters in the kitchen and master bath
(PI. Exh. 67), making the dividers in the cabinet above the refrigerator removable,
repairing the oak grid in the kitchen light box which became separated from the main
frame, repairing two or more rolling trays because of bad appearance and
delamination (PI. Exh. 50), installing shelves in the upper stage of the west corner
cabinet in the kitchen, installing shelves in the upstairs hall bath vanity, smoothing the
rough saw edge of the countertop on the appliance center (PI. Exh. 39), and placing a
file drawer in the kitchen desk as per drawings (PI. Exh. 31).
Defendant responded to Mr. Pack's letter of October 19, 1988 (PI. Exh. 9)
with a letter of October 22, 1988 (Def. Exh. 6). In that letter, Mrs. Lewis, while
defending the work of the Cabinet Shoppe, acknowledged that defendant would repair
several items in Mr. Pack's home to his satisfaction including the trim over the desk
and shelves, adjustment of the drawers and placement of the file drawer. Ms. Lewis
agreed that she knew that the job was not completed to Mr. Pack's satisfaction. (Tr.
169-70; Def. Exh. 6) Mrs. Lewis also acknowledged the need to arrange a
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reasonable, convenient time to repair the defects. The letter also discussed making
arrangements to meet at the Pack home and finalize the details. (Tr. 64)
After Sellers agreed to meet with Pack and resolve unfinished problems, Sellers
and Mr. Gary Lewis showed up at Mr. Pack's home on the evening of November 2,
1988. When Mr. Sellers and Mr. Lewis discovered Mr. Pack was not at home
waiting with a certified check, Mr. Lewis threatened Mr. Pack's 72-year-old father
with violence.
Mr. Pack, after the threat of violence to his father, felt it necessary to advise
Mr. Lewis (only Mr. Lewis) that he would not be permitted on the job at plaintiffs
house. Mr. Lewis had never been on the job site prior to November 2, 1988. (Tr.
28-9; PI. Exh. 12)
Mr. Lewis never testified and never denied his threats. Mr. Sellers, who did
testify, admitted that Lewis and he got into a "heated discussion" as to why Mr. Pack
was not there to supervise or approve the work. Mr. Pack testified that he did not
agree that he would be there when Sellers came or that he would provide a cashier's
check on demand. (Tr. 64-6)
After the November 2, 1988, incident, Mr. Pack on November 7th
communicated on the telephone with Mr. Sellers as to the items which remained to be
completed, and problem areas which needed to be corrected and Mr. Sellers' next
appearance on the job to address those items. (Tr. 29) The conversation between
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Mr. Pack and Mr. Sellers was documented in Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, a November 11,
1988, letter sent to Mr. Sellers as well as plaintiffs daytimer. (PI. Exh. 17) This
letter again set forth items which needed to be completed or repaired. Mr. Pack
referred to the telephone conversation between himself and Mr. Sellers in which Mr.
Sellers agreed to be at the Pack home on November 17, 1988, to complete the work
specified in the contracts and letters of October 19, 1988, and November 1, 1988.
(PI. Exhs. 12, 17) Mr. Sellers did return to the job a couple of times (Tr. 176), but
by December 1 of 1988 defendant totally stopped coming to Mr. Pack's house for any
reason leaving even the Cabinet Shoppe's punch list uncompleted. (Tr. 70-1) Clearly
defendant had access to the job site, until defendant decided not to finish its job.
Cases from Washington and Oregon discuss the issue of repairs and the
opportunity of contractors to conduct repairs. In Henery v. Robinson. 67 Wash. App.
277, 834 P.2d 1091 (1992) the court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had
refused to allow repairs to be done to plaintiffs mobile home. The evidence
demonstrated that plaintiff permitted multiple repairs before filing suit and defendant
had been gives a "reasonable opportunity to cure the defects". Id. at 1096.
In Imyn^n v Prcssnall. 274 Or. 285, 545 P.2d 1382 (1975), the buyers, like
Mr. Pack, gave the seller a list of defects in the home and gave the seller ample
opportunity to cure defects. The court allowed the buyer to revoke their acceptance of
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the home, despite buyers' claims that sellers refused to allow further attempts to
repair.
Mr. Pack clearly afforded defendant numerous opportunities to return and
complete the job contracted for, indeed, from mid-July when the job should have been
completed until the end of November. (PI. Exh. 17) Defendant had ample notice of
the problems in Mr. Pack's home which needed to be repaired or completed. (PI.
Exhs. 9-10, 12) Defendant breached the contract by failing complete the job it
contracted to perform.
The only evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion is the refusal by Mr.
Pack to allow Mr. Lewis to return to the house after threats were made to plaintiffs
father. This evidence when compared to testimony and court exhibits produced at
trial, clearly falls short of being persuasive. Mr. Lewis never did any work at the
Pack home before November 2, 1988, and none of the other Cabinet Shoppe
employees were ever banned from Mr. Pack's home. In fact, Mr. Sellers returned
several times to continue work on the Pack home, (Tr. 176) but failed to complete the
job.
The parties contracted for cabinets of the "highest quality" (PI. Exh. 1) and
agreed that the cabinets would be in "conformity with customary industry practices."
(PI. Exh. 3) Defendant failed to complete the job, thereby forfeiting any claim to the
full contract price. The trial court cannot employ Mr. Pack's sole exclusion of Mr.
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Lewis as evidence for their legal conclusion on this issue. Mr. Pack's actions in
refiising to allow Mr. Lewis into the Pack home were warranted by the "threats of
violence" to Mr. Pack's elderly father. The trial court's decision which allows
defendant to forego the completion of the job, yet allows collection of the full contract
price plus legal fees and costs is clearly erroneous.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DEFENDANT THE
FULL AMOUNT OF MONEY OWED UNDER THE CONTRACT,
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO COMPLETE TILE
WORK CONTRACTED FOR AND/OR FAILED TO COMPLETE
THE WORK IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER.
Mr. Pack hired defendant to construct "high-class", quality cabinets for his new

home. (Tr. 14) The contract documents signed by the parties reflected plaintiffs
insistence on high quality workmanship. (PI. Exh. 1, 3)
In the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack and signed by both parties,
very specific instructions were given requiring the "highest standard of quality" and
the "latest state of the art manufacturing techniques with a high regard for quality
control," (PL Exh. 1, p. 4)
The pfe-printed contract document prepared by defendant requires the same
high quality which assures performance in "conformity with customary industry
"practices" and warranties against "defects in material and workmanship". (PI. Exh.
3)
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Even aside from the express provisions in the contract documents regarding
workmanship, a contract for product and/or services imposes a duty to perform in a
skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Where parties contract as they did here, a
warranty is implied that the contract will be performed in a good workmanlike
manner. Good v. Christensen. 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); New Trends. Inc. v.
Stafford-LowdonCo.. 537 S.W.2d 778, 782 (Tex. Cir. App. 2 Dist. 1976); Chutich
v. Samuelson. 333 Colo. App. 195, 518 P.2d 1363, 1366 (1974); Lewis v, Anchorage
Asphalt Paving Co.. 535 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Alaska 1975); sL, M a s c a r a s v,
Jaramillo. I l l N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59, 61 (1991)
Defendant represented to plaintiff that it could and would perform a first class,
top of the line job. (Tr. 14) Mr. Pack relied upon defendant's representations in
entering into the contract.
Construction contracts cannot be completed in a substandard way. In Good.
527 P.2d at 224 the purchasers of a home sued a construction company after a heavy
snowfall caused the carport to collapse. Although the court denied recovery by
plaintiffs because the statute of limitations had run, the court stated:
A failure to perform work on any construction in a good and
workmanlike manner affords the owner a cause of action immediately.
Id. at 224.
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Plaintiffs expert witness at trial, Russell Ross, is a professional cabinet maker
and has been for over twenty (20) years. (Tr. 78) Mr. Ross testified at length to the
condition and appearance of defendant's work. It was his expert opinion that poor
workmanship on the cabinetry was visible throughout the entire home. (Tr. 115) In
fact, Mr. Ross confirmed and verified the deficiencies shown in plaintiff's numerous
photographs, which are trial exhibits 26 through 69 and are detailed on pages 9, 13,
14, 26 and 27. (Tr. 86-114) Mr. Ross' testimony was not controverted or refuted by
any other evidence. (Tr. 78-120) Mr. Ross further detailed the estimate of cost of
$4,361.50 necessary to comply with the original contract requirements. (Tr. 91; PI.
Exhs. 24-5)
In addition, defendant's own witness, James Sheldon Wayne, an employee of
Machinery & Hardware Supply, (Tr. 121) testified that although the parties contracted
for the "highest quality hinges available" (PI. Exh. 1) the Ferrari hinge was used in
Mr. Pack's home. This hinge is of a lesser quality than the Nepla hinge, carried by
Mr. Wayne's store. (Tr. 127) Mr. Wayne also confirmed other problems in the
defendant's workmanship, including a noticeable color contrast between the PVC tape
and oak fronti, and stain, (Tr. 129, PL Exhs. 27, 32-34, 36, 38-42, 45-6, 52, 63, 66)
and torn, gouged oak veneer and scratched PVC tape. (Tr. 131, PI. Exhs. 40, 42,
49, 54, 61, 62) All of the problems testified to by Mr. Ross and Mr. Wayne
contribute to the overall substandard appearance of the cabinets.
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Evidence at trial was presented through testimony and Plaintiffs Exhibits 9, 10
and 12 of specific work contracted for but not delivered. The uncompleted work did
not encompass extra items or add-ons but were within the four corners of the original
agreement. (Tr. 26)
Plaintiffs Exhibit 9, a letter to Mrs. Lewis from Mr. Pack dated October 19,
1988, detailed at least 18 repairs and corrections that needed to be completed by
defendant. These items, fully detailed in the fact section, included work on the toe
kick heaters (PL Exhs. 37, 67), enlargement of access ports for repair and
maintenance, replacement of the CDX plywood on the side of the wet bar assembly
(PL Exh. 58), repair to trim and nail hole molding as well as closing gaps on kitchen
cabinets. (PL Exhs. 26, 45-7) Plaintiffs Exhibits 10 and 12, letters from Mr. Pack
to Mr. Sellers on November 1, 1988, and November 11, 1988, respectively, reiterate
many of the above repairs needed to be made by defendant. The defects and
incompletions were never remedied. (Tr. 27)
As the only member of the Cabinet Shoppe who worked on the cabinet
installations in Mr. Pack's home, Mr. Sellers should have been well versed in the
specifications of the contract between the parties. Mr. Pack included very specific
instructions in his four-page contract document and assumed that these contract
provisions would be strictly adhered to. Mr. Sellers testified that he "probably never
read" the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack. (Tr. 187) Mr. Sellers had no
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knowledge that the contract document stated the Cabinet Shoppe was to mount the fan
and transition from the fan outlet to the exhaust flue, even though he installed it. (Tr.
187) Mr. Sellers did not know the contract document said the overlay fillers were to
be double thick or the same thickness as the cabinet doors on all the cabinets, so he
did it a different way, not in accord with the contract documents. (Tr. 187-8) Had
Mr. Sellers read the contract documents or communicated with the cabinet
manufacturers, many of the above-mentioned repairs and corrections would surely
have not been necessary.
The evidence clearly shows that defendant is not entided to the full contract
price of $8,500.00 under the contract documents. The contract was never completed
despite defendant's knowledge of its deficiencies and numerous opportunities afforded
to correct them. Moreover, defendant's completed work was not up to industry
standards, despite the promise in defendant's contract document, "Seller agrees that it
will perform this contract in conformity with customary industry practices." (PI. Exh.
3, para. 10) The only Cabinet Shoppe installer never even read the contract
documents or any of the written correspondence regarding the job specification, and
therefore wit ignorant as to what was required therein.
Finally, when a person contracts to perform work the law implies a contract on
his part to do the job in a workmanlike manner and to exercise reasonable care in
doing the work. Scott v. Strickland, 10 Kan. App. 2d 14, 691 P.2d 45 (1984) The
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evidence presented to the trial court is legally insufficient to support the outcome of
this action. Defendant failed to perform according to the contract and failed to
perform in a workmanlike manner and subsequently is not entitled to judgment against
plaintiff.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
DEFENDANT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY NOT
PROVIDING SPECIFIC DRAWINGS AND PLANS AS REQUIRED
BY THE PARTIES' CONTRACT.
Defendant admitted at trial that it intended to be bound by both contract

documents: the pre-printed standard form order supplied by the Cabinet Shoppe, as
well as the contract document prepared by Mr. Pack. (Tr. 12, 14-5, 166, PI. Exh. 1,
3) The contract document prepared by Mr. Pack states:
Contractor to provide owner with three complete sets of drawings on all
cabinets and return with signed agreement. Drawings to include details
of all features. Drawings to be approved by owner.
Mr. Pack testified to the importance of this provision several times during the course
of his testimony. (Tr. 17, 56-7) Most problems with the cabinet assembly and
installation would have been avoided had the drawings ever been provided.
Plaintiff tad defendant's witnesses testified to the fact that plaintiffs Exhibits 4
and 5 were drawings showing the basic layout of the sub-assemblies of the cabinets.
However, these drawings failed to show any frontal views (Tr. 17), details (Tr. 17,
57), or any elevations of the cabinets (Tr. 57). Mr. Pack testified that even though he
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took delivery of the cabinets, he continued to insist on detailed drawings in letters and
telephone conversations with defendant. (Tr. 57) On re-direct testimony of Mr.
Pack, it was revealed that modifications to the cabinet assemblies were required, not
because Mr. Pack changed his mind, but because without detailed drawings Mr. Pack
had no way of knowing how the completed cabinets would appear. (Tr. 76)
Defendant's witness, Luanda Jean Lewis, also testified concerning the
drawings. She stated that she prepared the preliminary drawings (Tr. 144) and sent
them to Mr. Pack with the Cabinet Shoppe's contract document. Mrs. Lewis, when
questioned on direct examination about the drawings stated that she felt the first set of
drawings would give Mr. Pack a general idea of the layout and she did not feel it was
necessary to redraw all the fascia drawings. (Tr. 15) Mrs. Lewis continued her
testimony, saying she usually "didn't do that type of drawing [fascia drawings] at all."
(Tr. 154)
Mrs. Lewis confirmed on cross examination that the drawings defendant
provided did not identify cabinetry elevations and were different from the as-built
product. (Tr. 164)
Defendant failed to present any evidence whatsoever that the drawings provided
to Mr. Pack were reliable (they were not), or that detailed drawings requested by Mr.
Pack were not necessary. In fact, plaintiffs expert, Russell Ross, testified that it was
a customary industry practice for a cabinet maker to provide detailed drawings to the
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owner of a particular project. (Tr. 81) Mr. Ross stated that a customer should have
elevations of the cabinets provided to him because without such face drawings and
elevations, the owner would be unable to deduce what finished cabinet assembly
would look like until they were in the home. (Tr. 82)
Defendant failed to perform according to the precise language of the contract
documents it signed. They failed, despite repeated requests by Mr. Pack through
letters and telephone conversations, to provide any detailed drawings. The drawings
provided to Mr. Pack failed to give frontal views, details, materials, or any elevations
despite testimony that customary industry standard is to provide detailed drawings.
Without detailed drawings, the homeowner cannot know the appearance of the finished
product.
While a court's factual determinations will not be disturbed if based on
substantial evidence, Kimball. 699 P.2d at 716, no finding was made by the trial court
as to this issue. However, the evidence presented does clearly show that defendant
failed to perform their obligations under the contract. There is no evidence to marshal
in support for the trial court's decision on this issue, as none was offered.

The evidence, supported by testimony and exhibits at trial, is unclouded. Mr.
Pack clearly allowed Mr. Sellers to continue to work in the home, the cabinets were
not completed to specifications, nor done in a workmanlike manner, and drawings
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which would have greatly facilitated and simplified the construction of the cabinets,
were never supplied. Substantial, competent evidence must exist to support a trial
court's findings. 50 West Broadway Associates. 784 P 2d at 1171 The trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 7 that Mr. P^ck materially breached the contract, is not so
supported.
Furthermore, the legal determination and result of the facts presented is a legal
issue for which the court will give no deference to the trial court's determination.
Scharff, 700 P.2d at 1070.

POINT m
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S
WITNESS TO TESTIFY AFTER VIOLATING THE WITNESS
EXCLUSIONARY RULE INVOKED BY DEFENDANT.
Defendant moved to exclude the witnesses at trial before opening statements
and the court granted defendant's motion. Mr. Russell Ross, the plaintiffs expert was
thereby excluded from the courtroom. Defendant's counsel at this point claimed that
his witnesses were an exception to the ruling and entitled to remain because they were
principals of the defendant company. Defendant also had a third witness "who's not
here yet, and I've got no problem with him being excluded/ (Tr. 5) Even though
only the principals should have been allowed to remain on behalf of defendant
company, non-principal Luanda Jean Lewis was present throughout the trial. After
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opening statements Mr. Pack, plaintiffs expert and defendant's first witness testified
and were cross-examined by the respective attorneys.
When Mrs. Lewis took the stand to testify she revealed that she was not in fact
a principal or owner of the Cabinet Shoppe, but was only married to a co-owner,
Gary Lewis. Plaintiff's counsel immediately objected to Mrs. Lewis' further
testimony because defendant violated the court's order excluding witnesses.
The trial court determined that defendant's counsel had falsely represented that
Mrs. Lewis was a principal in the business. (Tr. 134) However, the trial court
erroneously excused the prejudicial nature of the violation and Mrs. Lewis' obviously
tainted testimony. Mrs. Lewis was allowed to testify even though she had been
present and heard the testimony of each of the other witnesses. (Tr. 134)
Whether the witness' testimony in violation of the exclusion rule is admissible
is a question of law and is reviewed under a correctness standard. Ramirez. 817 P.2d
at 781, n. 3
Upon violation of the exclusion rule, several enforcement options are available
to the court, including punishment for contempt, exclusion of the testimony of the
violating witness, and/or a declaration of a mistrial or setting aside of the verdict.
Annotation, Counsel's Reference, In the Presence of Sequestered Witness in State
Criminal Trial, to Testimony of Another Witness as Grounds for Mistrial or Reversal,
24 A.L.R. 4th 489 (1983).
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The violation of the exclusionary rule by Mrs. Lewis severely prejudiced Mr.
Pack. Mrs. Lewis was present during and heard all the relevant testimony. She heard
plaintiffs expert and defendant's first witness testify. More importandy, she heard
Mr. Pack testify. She was the person who conducted all contract negotiations with
Mr. Pack, received all of Mr. Pack's correspondence. She had ample time to
formulate expiating responses to Mr. Pack's testimony regarding her contacts with him
and their discussions regarding defects and installation.
Mrs. Lewis' presence during the prior testimony was a direct violation of the
principal purpose behind the exclusion of witnesses rule; i.e. to prevent witnesses
from hearing other testimony and questions. The rule exercises restraint on a witness'
opportunity to tailor and conform her testimony to that of earlier witnesses. The rule
aids the court and counsel to detect testimony that is less than candid. Geders v.
United States. 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330 (1975). Having heard all of Mr. Pack's
testimony, Mrs. Lewis was able to tailor her answers to do as much harm to his
testimony as possible. All preliminary discussions, contract negotiations and
discussions erf uncompleted or incorrect work were exclusively between Mr. Pack and
Mrs. Lewis. (Tr. 14-21, 136-40, 145-8, 153-8, 187)
When the rule excluding witnesses is violated, a just, appropriate remedy
depends upon the prejudice shown. Here the prejudice is obvious by examining Mrs.
Lewis' testimony and the trial court's ruling. Even so, "trial courts have full power
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to punish violations of such orders as contempt even when the violation is not
prejudicial." State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 1264 (Utah 1983). In the case at
hand, the trial court abused its discretion when it did nothing despite Mrs. Lewis'
obviously unfair opportunity to hear plaintiffs testimony and to prepare her own
counter-testimony.
Mrs. Lewis was able to counter the major defects Mr. Pack described to the
court. Her answers seem tailored to direcdy confront and challenge Mr. Pack's
testimony, including how defendant graciously reduced the contract amount to satisfy
Mr. Pack (Tr. 138-9), and how Mrs. Lewis' carefully recorded specific dimensions
with respect to the cabinets (Tr. 142-3). She claimed that defendant "felt that
everything had been accomplished that he [Pack] had requested at that time" before
sending defendant's bill in October. (Tr. 147) Mrs. Lewis' contended that she never
saw plaintiffs correspondence until the day before the trial (Tr. 149). She was able
to manufacture alleged instructions from Mr. Pack but on cross examination could not
recall when or where such instructions were given. (Tr. 151-2)
Defendant's direct examination of Mrs. Lewis was facilitated by the fact that
she was present during the previous testimony. For example, defendant's attorney
premised his examination of Mrs. Lewis on the prior testimony of Mr. Pack: "Mr.
Pack testified that he went to a Citation homes-home to inspect?" Mrs. Lewis
responded "Yes". (Tr. 160)
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Plaintiffs expert, Mr. Ross, when asked questions about a "trim kit" for an
appliance testified that under normal circumstances it would be possible to ascertain
what size to build a cabinet to fit the trim kit. (Tr. 98-9) Mrs. Lewis admitted in her
cross-examination that she received a letter with appliance dimensions enclosed, but
never dimensions for the trim kit. (Tr. 143) During cross-examination Mrs. Lewis
adamantly denied the ability to adapt the cabinet for the trim kit without the specific
specifications. (Tr. 161-3) Her adamant denial logically stemmed from the strong,
expert opinion of Mr. Ross, whose testimony she should never have heard.
Mr. Pack, was prejudiced by defendant's witness* "informed testimony", and is
entitled to relief. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing defendant's witness,
who remained in the courtroom, influenced and coached by what she heard, to testify.
At the least, plaintiff should be entitled to a new trial on this ground, if not outright
reversal.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
AWARDING DEFENDANT ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES AT TRIAL.
The trkl court correctly exercised its ability to award attorney fees in this
action. It is a well-settled rule that attorney fees may be awarded if they are provided
for under an enforceable contract provision and the award is consistent with the terms
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of the contract. Hoth. 799 P.2d at 219 Utah law also provides that calculation of
reasonable attorney fees will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; Turtle Mgmt.. Inc. v. Haggis
Mgmt. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)
However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the
record. Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d at 988; Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 624
(Utah 1985) ("award of attorney fees must generally be made on the basis of findings
of fact support by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of law").
As clearly shown in prior arguments, the evidence presented at trial does not
support findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the trial court. In fact, the
"findings" of fact are not true factual findings from the evidence at trial, but are legal
conclusions against the clear weight of all the evidence, trial. While the court found
that both contract documents were signed by the parties, and the parties felt both
contract documents were binding, (Findings of Fact 1 and 2), the trial court
inexplicably concluded that the contract document prepared by the Cabinet Shoppe
controlled because paragraph 8 in that document excluded all prior agreements
(notwithstanding its clear rejection by Mr. Pack).
The trial court's "finding" really concluded that even though Mr. Pack clearly
wrote "take exception" beside paragraph 8, this language only "expresses displeasure
with these terms, and does not eliminate those provisions from the second contract."
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(Finding of Fact 4) Mr. Pack explained the phrase to the Cabinet Shoppe in a letter
sent to defendant on June 28, 1988, and upon hearing no reply understood both
contract documents to be controlling (Tr 16) and the rejected provisions to be out of
the contract, as did defendant (Tr. 166).
The trial court further concluded that Mr. Pack awarded defendant no
opportunity to satisfy objections made regarding the Cabinet Shoppe's performance
and in doing so, Mr. Pack breached the parties' contract. (Findings of Fact 6 and 7)
The arguments set forth in Point II clearly show that all evidence presented at trial is
contrary to the trial court's "finding" on this issue.
The trial court's "finding" no. 9, awarding defendant the fall amount owed
under the contract is also in error. The argument above clearly outlines the fact that
defendant never completed the job or complied with the term prerequisite for
payment. Defendant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the contract.
The trial court's legal conclusion is obviously not supported by the factual
evidence presented at trial. In fact, the award of attorney fees to defendant
demonstrates a showing of clear abuse of discretion and thus this award should be
reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Many problems arose in the construction and installation of these cabinets,
which never should have arisen. Had the Cabinet Shoppe performed according to the
terms and specifications of the contract, Mr. Pack would have no complaints and the
contract would have been paid in full. However, defendant failed to fulfill the
contract and manufacture a quality, acceptable product. Clearly defendant is
responsible for the problems and Mr. Pack was justified in refusing to pay. Now
defendant, a bankrupt corporation, has been awarded a judgment as if it fully
performed, which it did not. Plaintiff has a terrible cabinet job that will cost more to
bring up to the minimum contract standards than the unpaid amount on defendant's
contract. Defendant even now claims interest for the two years it delayed the
judgment in this matter by its bankruptcy.
This contract consisted of the accepted terms in both agreements and the letters
detailing cabinet specifications. Defendant failed to meet the terms of that contract
and is not entitled to payment, (PI. Exh. 1)
Defendant's judgment should be reversed and the case remanded, for entry of
judgment in favor of Mr. Pack, for his damages as supported by the record, his
attorney fees and release of the mechanics lien. Defendant's judgment should be
entirely vacated.
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Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale dated June 29, 1992

B.
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Attorney for Defendant/
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36 South State Streetn
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF FORECLOSURE
AND ORDER OF SALE

vs.
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaimant
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah
corporation; CAFFALL TILE &
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L.
PACK, JR.,

Civil No. 89-CV-45
Honorable Maurice N. Jones

Third-Party Defendants.
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in this matter, now makes and enters its
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DECREE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That there is due and owing to the defendant/

counterclaimant The Cabinet Shoppe Inc. (hereinafter "Cabinet
Shoppe") from the plaintiff/counterdefendant E. L. Pack &
Associates and third party defendant E. L. Pack, Jr. (hereinafter
"Pack") the sum of $5,025.00, together with interest from and
after October 4, 1988 until paid at the rate of ten percent (10%)
per annum until entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per
annum thereafter, together with attorney's fees and costs of
court of $2,947.00. Pursuant to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial
Administration, this amount shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by
affidavit.
2.

That said sums are secured by a mechanic's lien recorded

December 16, 1988 as Entry #301604, Summit County recorder, and
constitute a lien on the following described real property:
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the
official records of the County Recorder of Summit
County, State of Utah
3. That the secured premises shall be sold at public
auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of
Summit County, State of Utah.
4.

That said Sheriff, after the time allowed by law for
2
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redemption has expired, shall execute a deed to the purchaser or
purchasers at the sale, and if any of the parties to this action
who may be in possession of the premises, or any part thereof, or
any person who has come into posession since the commencement of
this action shall refuse to deliver possession of the premises,
or any part thereof, to such purchaser or purchasers on
production of the deed for the premises, or any part thereof, the
said purchaser shall be entitled to the issuance of a writ of
restitution, without further notice, to compel delivery of the
premises to the purchaser or purchasers.
5.

That the proceeds of the sale shall be applied as

follows, in the following order:
First, to the payment of the Sheriff's fees, costs of sale
and disbursements;
Second, to the payment to the plaintiff of the total sums
set forth in paragraph one above;
6.

That should the proceeds of sale be insufficient to pay

the sums above-described, then plaintiff may be entitled to a
deficiency judgment against Pack upon filing the proper
affidavits to support such a judgment.
7.

That Pack, and all persons claiming under them, after

the filing of the lis pendens, be and they are hereby forever
barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and equity of
3

Qnnnn*

redemption in and to the secured premises and every part thereof,
from and after the date of the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff
of Summit County, State of Utah.

DATED this C^f

day of jL^y^^< ,„^
BY THE

Approved as to form:

Stephen L. Henroid
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1992, I

served the foregoing Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale upon
the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to his
offices at the following address:
Stephen L. Henroid
Henroid & Henroid
gnj-t-P
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S a l t Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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FILED
L. Edward Robbins, #2766
Attorney for Defendant/
Counterclaimant
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Streetn
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-7030
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
E. L. PACK & ASSOCIATES,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaimant
THE CABINET SHOPPE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
CAFFALL TILE & MARBLE, a Utah
corporation; CAFFALL TILE &
SUPPLY, INC. dba CAFFALL TILE
QUALITY LINE PRODUCTS, E. L.
PACK, JR.,

Civil No. 89-CV-45
Honorable Maurice N. Jones

Third-Party Defendants.
This matter came on for trial on the 8th day of May,
1990 before this Court sitting without a jury, the Honorable
Maurice N. Jones presiding.

Following trial, the Court announced
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its findings and conlusions in open court and now enters its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Counsel for

defendant/counterclaimant has represented to the court that
following trial Gary and Lowanda Lewis, prinicpals in the Cabinet
Shoppe, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding in California,
hence the delay in preparing formal Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

For simplicity, plaintiff/counterdefendant

E. L. Pack and Associates and Third Party Defendant E. L. Pack,
Jr. shall be referred to as "Pack" and defendant/counterclaimant
The Cabinet Shoppe, Inc. shall be referred to as "Cabinet
Shoppe."
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds that there are two contracts in this

case, one prepared and presented to the Cabinet Shoppe by Pack
(Trial Exhibit 1), and one prepared and presented to Pack by the
Cabinet Shoppe (Trial Exhibit 3).
the parties.

Both contracts were signed by

The first contract consists of four typewritten

pages, the first page of which bears the caption "E. L. Pack &
Associates."

The second contract consists of one typewritten

page and bears the caption "Standard Form Agreement for Cabinets
and Installation."

Both contracts were signed by the parties.

2. The court further finds that the parties felt both
contracts were binding, however, there are conflicts between the
contracts which the court must decide.
2
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3.

The court finds that the second contract, by its terms,

supercedes the first contract and that as to any conflicting
provisions, the terms of the second contract control•

The court

bases this finding on paragraph eight of the second contract,
wherein it is said that "This agreement sets forth the entire
transaction between the parties; any and all prior agreements,
made by either party are superseded by this agreement."
4.

The court further finds that although Pack wrote "takes

exception" to paragraph eight of the second contract, as well as
to other provisions of the second contract, that his so writing
was not a sufficient act to eliminate those provisions from the
agreement betweeen the parties. The court finds that to
eliminate those provisions from the second contract, Pack should
have lined out those provisions.

The court finds that while the

language "takes exception" expresses displeasure with those
terms, it does not eliminate those provisions from the second
contract.
5.

The court further finds that although the Cabinet Shoppe

initially bid the job in question at $17,000.00, it finally
agreed to perform the job for $8,500.00, of which amount Pack
paid $3,500.00.
6.

There is also an issue as to contract performance. The

court finds that even under the superceded terms of the first
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contract, the Cabinet Shoppe offered to make the corrections
requested by Pack upon payment by Pack for the work, but that
Pack did not cooperate so as to permit this to happen.

The

second contract specifically requires payment to be made upon
delivery of the cabinets.

Pack took no exception to this term

and yet when the Cabinet Shoppe attempted to satisfy his
objections so as to receive payment, Pack afforded the Cabinet
Shoppe no opportunity to make repairs or adjustments.
7.

The court finds that Pack materially breached the second

contract by failing to pay for the cabinets and by failing to
allow the Cabinet Shoppe to make the corrections requested,
and that the Cabinet Shoppe had no reasonable opportunity under
the circumstances to make the corrections requested.
8.

Consistent with the foregoing findings, the court finds

against Pack as to the allegations of his complaint, no cause of
action being proven thereon, and all damages claimed thereby
being speculative.
9.

The court finds that Pack paid $3,500.00 of the

$8,500.00 contract price, leaving a debt owed to the Cabinet
Shoppe of $5,025.00 ($5,000.00 plus $25.00 late charge),
together with interest at the legal rate from and after October
4, 1988, the date of demand by Cabinet Shoppe, until paid.
10.

The court further finds that the Cabinet Shoppe is
4
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entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs of court under
paragraph seven of the second agreement.

In this case, counsel

for the parties have submitted affidavits as to attorney's fees
and costs of court incurred.

The court finds the attorney's

fees and costs set forth by counsel for the Cabinet Shoppe to be
in sufficient detail and reasonable under the circumstances, and
hereby awards attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00 to the
Cabinet Shoppe.
11.

At trial, the parties agreed that no technical

objection was made to the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe.

The court

having found in favor of the Cabinet Shoppe as to the debt in
question, also finds the lien of the Cabinet Shoppe on the
property in question duly enforceable according to law.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That pursuant to the second contract between the

parties (Trial Exhibit 3>, Pack owes to the Cabinet Shoppe the
sum of $5,025.00, together with interest thereon from and after
October 4, 1988 until paid at ten percent (10%) per annum prior
to entry of decree and twelve percent (12%) per annum after entry
of decree, and attorney's fees and costs of $2,947.00. Pursuant
to Rule 4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, this amount
shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution
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or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit.
2.

That the Cabinet Shoppe is entitled to a decree of

foreclosure pursuant to its mechanic's lien duly recorded in the
offices of the Summit County Recorder as Entry #301604 on
December 16, 1988. That property is more particularly identified
as
Lot 41, Jeremy Ranch Plat #1, according to the
official records in the Office of the County
Recorder of Summit County, State of Utah.
3.

The foregoing premises are ordered sold at public

auction in the manner prescribed by statute by the Sheriff of
Summit County, State of Utah, pursuant to the order of this
court.
4.

That the proceeds of the sale should be applied in

accordance with the Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale to be
entered herein; that in the event that the proceeds of the sale
are insufficient to pay the sums owing to the Cabinet Shoppe,
that the Cabinet Shoppe should be awarded a deficiency judgment
against Pack for any sums remaining unpaid.
5.

That Pack and all persons claiming under them should be

forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and
estate in and to said premises, and, after the period of
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redemption expires, should be barred and foreclosed of all right
and equity of redemption therein and thereto•
DATED this

Hcf

day of J/^^fCxC.

BY THE >C0URT:

Approved as to form:

Stephen L. Henroid
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1992.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on the

day of June, 1992, I

served the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
upon the following by hand delivery of a true and correct copy to
his offices at the following address:
Stephen L. Henroid
Henroid & Henroid
Suite 700-38 Eagle Gate Tower^?&L~^
60 East South Main Cfcroot ipTS.rj^c
/*t«r*£ <T*#7* So* ^
*^
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

L. Edward Robbms
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will

clear.

02 to
include
student
desk
With
two
pencil
drawers.
cabinet
above
desk
as
shown
on drawing.
'Allow
space
top of cabinet
and
ceiling.

cabinets

to

Hold distance

include

between

oak kick
double

plates.

cabinet

doors

^ XX
to 4MM.

ftAll drawer fronts
to have
rabbet
Joints;
dowelled,
glued,
and
^-^^^
screwed.
All
drawers
to have metal sides.
Drawers supplied
to be
<L©wV *#*
contractors
top
of
the
line
style
and
construction.
Discuss
co/3,struct ion ojf
iv^suctx*^
drawers
with
owner.
lj) Overlay
fillers
to be
double
thick
or same thickness
as
cabinet
^
doors on all
cabinets.
13/
[

7u.

u

* » i i doors

and drawers

to be a minimum of

13/16

inch

thick.

All drawer fronts to be one solid piece
of oak.
Carefully look
over raised
panel doors
that are
laminated. Doors with obvious
grey streaks,
red streaks,
conflicting
grain flows, etc.,will
be
changed out by
contractor.
Stain
to be applied
evenly.
Over staining
accepted. Extra care to
be taken
where raised
cabinet doors meet frame portion.
Beveled portion
of raised panel

t

of cabinet
to eliminate

Make maximum effort
will not be accepted.

areas will not be
panel portion of

doors to be milled as smooth as face
over staining of beveled
areas.

to match grain

flows.

Knots

in any

cabinets

tfSft&'lOv-' + Two of
the
five
upper stage
cabinet
assemblies
in
the
p ~.£fj #
entertainment center
to have double doors.
Upper stage cabinet
r ™ lip
next to
wet bar and upper stage cabinet next to east wall to be
tfi^'^J (\*? open with adjustable
shelves.
Stereo speakers
(owner furnished)
^ l ? 1 v\i^*" / t o ^e Placec* in these
areas.
Those cabinets
out
trays.

to the east

Lazy susan's supplied
quality
available.

by

of the kitchen
contractor

island

shall

to have two roll

be

of

the

highest

Contractor to
remove all
shipping cartons,
paper, boxes, cans,
bottles,
lunch sacks, etc.
brought
on to job
by him or his
employees. Leave all installation
areas clean and swept.
Remaining sanding
marks;
gouges; holes; un-even application of
stains,
^sealers,
and lacquer;
mis-Installed
hardware,
faulty
hinges, faulty
drawer rollers,
any doors or drawers out of level
or square; any cabinets out of level or square; not
anchored to
wall properly;
any doors
or drawers
not operating smoothly and
correctly;
etc. ; will be considered a job un-completed.
Contractor responsible
linoleum, etc.,
as well
Contractor
around all

to
provide
upper stage

for damage to paint,
as cabinets during
and install
cabinets.

wall board,
installation.

doors,

crown molding and dental mold

All upper and lower stage cabinets
to include
construction,
with rounded corners.

raised

panel

type

Contractor to
provide owner with three complete sets of drawings
on all cabinets and return
with
signed
agreement.
Drawings to
include
details
of all
features.
Drawings to be approved by
owner.

Contractor
to use
the^ ^ljitest
state
of
the
art
techniques
with
a high^regard
for quality
control.
use the highest
quality
materials
available.

manufacturing
Contractor
to

W Contractor
is a licensed
contractor,
and liable
for any
necessary
permits
and
licenses
required
to
work
in
Summit
County.
Contractor
to be fully
insured
and
carry
Utahtystate
Workman's
Compensation
Insurance.
Owner not responsible
for lost
or
stolen
tools
and or materials.
Owner not responsible
for death or
injury
incurred
at job by contractor
or his
employees.
Contractor
to provide
cabinets
for entire^hou^^^^r^the
above
but
qg£^limited^
to;
for
the 'amount
of"*
IPf-TOO. ° °
.
Price
includes
drap&ge;
installation,
sales
tax.
Cabinets
to
be'
guaranteed
for'period
of two'years.
Cabinets
td be of the
highest
standard
of* quality,
no seconds
will'be
accepted.
Contractor
to
Entertain
any reasonable
requests
by
owner.
BxL'fPack
agrees
after
completion
Contractor

E.L.

Pack

Qabinets

to
provide
payment
and final
inspection

tf€f****£j.iHU?

S*Cy

A ,

if full
by E.L*

~~ &r/<Lr*-

rZr£$?)

to be delivered

end

installed

on:

,/

within
Pack

thirty

Date

&

Date

S

days

^^<P*

~/¥

P<P

STANDARD FORM OF AbKttnc*.

JetweenaT K^L
Hoie AadSress

- r^rJL

Purchaser

1ST

Delivery A d d r e s s ^ ^ ^ ^ h o
And Seller: THE CABINET.SHOPPE Phon* (307)-782-6129
Address:
P.tL Bar 1379 Lvaan. «v. 82937
o* I. The seller agrees to furnish the materials and services set forth in the drawings (I
description annexed hereto.
Contract price
I XjgVO*6*
Sales tax
$
Total purchase price
Sff^CTk?,0^
Schedule of payeent:
'
Upon signing of this agreement..!
II Upon pickup/delivery
%<f ,<Tft>CQ~~

and dated

) and

This contract includes the teres and provisions as set forth herein.
Please read and sign where indicated.
°* 2. The delivery date, when given, shall be deeaed approxiiate and performance is subject to delays caused by strikes,
fires, natural disasters, availability of the product at the tiie of delivery.
#K3. The risk of loss, as to daaage or destruction, shall be upon the delivery and receipt of the product. The purchaser
agrees to accept delivery of the product when ready. II Cabinets not picked up after 5 days of coipletion are subject to storage
charges. Cabinets not picked up after 30 days will be sold to recover the balance due.
<?K4. The purzhiser understands that the products described m specially designed and custoe built and that the seller takes
iaaediate steps upon execution of this agreeaent to design, order and construct those iteas set forth herein; therefore, this
agreeaent is not subject to cancellation by the purchaser for any reason.
5 ?<c*» 5. No installation, pluabing, electrical/ flooring, decorating or other construction work is to be provided unles;
specifically set forth.
ovt &. Cabinet area is to be heated; aust be cleared of all debris, painted and all electric and pluabing. ready before cabinet
are installed. Seller is not responsible for daaaged products after delivery and,or installation.
° * 7. Delays in payaent shall be subject to a late charge of 125.00 per aonth. If the seller is required to engage th
services of a collection agency or an attorney, the purchaser agrees to reiaburse the seller for any reasonable aaounts expende
in order to collect the unpaid balance.
fH «*c«£ B. This agreeaent sets forth the entire transaction between the parties; any and ail prior agreeaents, aade by either pari
are superseded by this agreeaent. All changes in this agreeaent shall be aade by a separate docuaent and executed with the sa/
foraalities.
9. The seller retains the right upon breach of this agreeaent by the purchaser to sell those iteas m the seller
possession, in effecting any resale on breach of this agreeaent by the purchaser, the purchaser shall be liable for any n
deficiency on resale.
10. The seller agrees that it will perfora this contract in ccnforaity with custoaary industry practices. The ourchas
agrees that any claia for adjustaent shall not be reason or cause for failure to aake payaent arising froa or under i \
contract shall be* settled by arbitration and jurisd>c^on, the arbitration shall be held under the rules of the Aaer::
Arbitration Association.
Accepted:

Q^^T^S^HOL

Sexier

Pate 6n?£jK

.

Accepted\^7.£.
Purchaser

7^£>

Mtg-Zf-pp
DESCRIPTION ATTACHED
CABINET WARRANTY

THE CABINET SHOPPE warrants their cabinets against defects in aatenal and workaanship for a period an one year froa the dat
delivery to the original purchaser.
THE CABINET SHOPPE warrants their drawer guides, hinges and adjustable shelf rails for a period of three years.
Iapcrtant: This warranty does not cover daaage resulting froa aisuse, abuse, or lack of care to the cabinets. All wan
defective parts aust be returned to THE CABINET SHOPPE prepaid. >*This warranty does not include labor, aileage or install.
charges. This warranty is VOID if payaent is 30 days past due/ You aay obtain warranty service by calling THE CABINET S!
A^Monrlum D

